Education, growth and income inequality by Coen Teuling & Thijs van Rens
Education, Growth and Income Inequality
C o e nT e u l i n g sa n dT h i j sv a nR e n s ∗
First version: January 2001
This version: July 2006
Abstract
Estimates of the eﬀect of education on GDP (the social return) have been hard
to reconcile with micro evidence on the private return to schooling. We present
a simple explanation combining two ideas: imperfect substitution and endogenous
skill-biased technological progress and use cross-country panel data on inequality
and GDP to test these ideas. A one-year increase in the level of education reduces
the private return by 2 percentage points, consistent with Katz-Murphy’s [1992]
elasticity of substitution. We ﬁnd no evidence for reversal of this initial eﬀect as in
Acemoglu [2002]. In the short run, the social return equals the private return.
JEL classiﬁcation: E24, J24, O15
Keywords: growth, inequality, education, private and social return to schooling,
compression eﬀect
∗Coen Teulings, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis and University of
Amsterdam, C.N.Teulings@cpb.nl. Thijs van Rens, CREI and Universitat Pompeu Fabra,
thijs.vanrens@upf.edu.We thank Miguel Portela for excellent research assistance and Mikael Lindahl
and Daniele Checchi for sharing their datasets. We are also grateful to Roland Bénabou, Richard Blun-
dell, Steve Bond, Maurice Bun, Antonio Ciccone, Rema Hanna, Alan Krueger, Jong-Wha Lee, Mikael
Lindahl, Francesc Ortega, Miquel Pellicer, Miguel Portela, Giorgio Primiceri, Robert Shimer, partici-
pants of the 2002 annual meeting of the Society of Labor Economists and two anonymous referees for
helpful comments. Thijs van Rens gratefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the Generalitat de
Catalunya, DURSI, grants Beatriu de Pinós and 2005SGR 0049, and the Spanish Ministry of Education
and Sciences, grant SEJ2005-01124.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Under perfect competition, the social rate of return to education, the eﬀect on log
GDP of increasing the education level of a country’s workforce by one year, equals the
Mincerian private rate of return. This prediction seems to be contradicted by the data:
in growth regressions, the education level seems to have little eﬀect on the level of GDP,
b u tas t r o n ge ﬀect on its growth rate. We present a simple model that reconciles the
empirical growth literature with the micro evidence on the private return to schooling.
This result depends on two commonly accepted ideas: imperfect substitution between
worker types and endogenous skill-biased technological progress. The model suggests an
empirical strategy to estimate both the social and the private return from cross-country
panel data. Previous papers have used data on GDP to analyze the social return to
education. Our idea is to use data on income inequality to estimate the private return as
well. We ﬁnd that the joint evolution of the social and the private return to education is
consistent with our model, with previous evidence on the degree of substitution between
worker types and with estimates of the private return from micro data. In the short
run, the social return equals the private return; in the long run, however, endogenous
technological progress creates an externality that increases the social return substantially
above the private return.
Imperfect substitution between worker types provides the identifying assumption
that allows us to estimate the private return from inequality data. If workers with
various levels of education were perfect substitutes, relative wages would be independent
of the distribution of human capital. However, if high and low skilled workers are
imperfect substitutes [Katz and Murphy 1992], then the rate of return to schooling
must be negatively related to the average education level of the workforce: raising the
average education level makes low-skilled workers scarcer, which increases their wages.
At the same time, it increases the supply of highly educated workers and lowers their
relative wages. As a result, the return to human capital falls.
Without externalities in education, the social rate of return to education equals the
private rate, so that imperfect substitution between worker types has joint implications
for GDP and income dispersion. We expect a negative second-order eﬀect of education
on GDP and a negative eﬀect on income inequality. We formally model these eﬀects in
an assignment model with heterogeneous workers and heterogeneous jobs; see Teulings
[1995, 2005]. In this model, highly educated workers have a comparative advantage
in complex jobs; the return to education is therefore higher for more complex jobs.
When the supply of highly educated workers increases, some of these workers accept less
complex jobs, where their human capital has a lower return. The model thus predicts a
negative relationship between the aggregate supply of education and its rate of return.
There is a large literature on the eﬀect of education on inequality. Typically, these
models focus on two eﬀects: a more unequal education distribution implies more in-
come inequality (the ‘composition’ eﬀect) and a higher average education level implies
less income inequality (the ‘compression’ eﬀect) [Knight and Sabot 1983]. Becker and
Chiswick [1966] were the ﬁrst to show that in the data (across regions in the US) the
average level of education is indeed negatively correlated with income inequality. Since
2then, the same relation has been shown to hold also across countries and within coun-
tries over time [De Gregorio and Lee 2002]. In this paper, we focus on the compression
eﬀect and derive joint implications for GDP growth and income inequality.
Contrary to the predictions of our model, previous research has documented a re-
lationship between education levels and GDP growth across countries, but no eﬀect of
changes in education on changes in GDP [Benhabib and Spiegel 1994; Barro and Sala-i-
Martin 1999]. These results have cast doubt on the relevance of the Mincer equation for
the aggregate level, and have increased the popularity of human capital based endoge-
nous growth models, in which there are strong externalities of investments in education.
For example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin argue that a higher education level enables the
labor force to deal more eﬀectively with technological innovations, yielding a positive
relationship between the level of human capital and the growth of output. Empirical
studies, however, have failed to ﬁnd evidence of externalities [Heckman and Klenow
1997; Acemoglu and Angrist 1999].
The static, perfectly competitive, assignment model described above can be extended
to allow for dynamics caused by ﬁrms’ decisions to invest in new technologies and by
positive externalities in knowledge accumulation. Following Acemoglu [2002], we argue
that investments in new, skill-biased technologies are more proﬁtable when educated
workers are more abundant. Since an increase in the average education level reduces the
rate of return to education, it makes the application of skill-biased technologies more
proﬁtable and induces ﬁrms to invest in new technologies. Assuming that investing
in knowledge is more human capital intensive than goods production, an increase in
the average education level of the workforce will initially induce higher investments in
new knowledge. However, as this new knowledge enlarges the skill bias in the applied
technology, the demand for human capital starts moving up, eroding the proﬁtability of
further investments in knowledge. This mechanism will cause the long run social return
to education to exceed the private return and possibly even reverses the initial negative
eﬀect of a higher average education level on its private return.
Causality is always an issue for empirical research in this area: does a higher educa-
tion level lead to higher GDP or is it the other way around? Indeed, Bils and Klenow
[2000] have argued that the causation from education to growth should be reversed.
However, their arguments apply to the endogenous growth relation, and not to the Min-
cerian earnings function.1 We argue that in a dynamic panel setting, time-lags in the
causation from GDP to the average schooling level help to solve the endogeneity prob-
lem. Consider an exogenous increase in GDP, which causes an increase in the desired
education level. To realize the increase in education, the political system ﬁrst has to
decide how much of the additional tax revenues to spend on education. Then, new
teachers have to be trained and new educational facilities have to be built. The ﬁrst
cohorts will beneﬁt from improved training only after these changes have been made.
And these cohorts of better educated students enter the labor market only several years
1Bils and Klenow argue that if endogenous growth is due to the role of education diﬀusing the most
recent state of technology, then the education of new cohorts should be more valuable, leading to a
negative correlation between growth and the return to experience.
3later. Therefore, we argue that it is reasonable to assume that GDP aﬀects education
with at least a ten-year lag.
We ﬁnd strong support for a negative relationship between the supply of human
capital and its return. Moreover, the compression eﬀect we ﬁnd in the inequality and
in the GDP data is very similar: a one-year increase in the stock of human capital
reduces its return by 2 percentage points. This estimate is consistent with Katz and
Murphy’s [1992] and Ciccone and Peri’s [2005] estimates of the elasticity of substitution
between low and high skilled workers in the US. Moreover, our estimates for the private
return to education from inequality data are also consistent with Mincerian returns to
schooling estimated from microdata in several countries. The social return to education
approximately equals the private return in the short run, once we control for country-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects and endogenous technological progress. This is a considerable step
forward for the growth literature, which has typically found that the eﬀect of increases
in education on growth is insigniﬁcant. The social return to education is much higher in
the long run than it is in the short run. However, we ﬁnd no evidence for dynamics in the
private rate of return beyond the initial drop after an increase in the average education
level of the workforce. This suggests the presence of strong positive externalities of
education that are realized slowly over time, for instance because a higher schooling
level spurs technological development. However, we do not ﬁnd support for Acemoglu’s
[2002] prediction that this endogenous technological progress is skill-biased, because we
do not observe an increase in the private return in the long run.
Despite the fact that our estimate of the long run social return is lower than es-
timates found in previous studies, it is still quite large. Based on our estimates, the
long run return from investments in education over the sample period is higher even
than actual GDP growth. This relates our analysis to O’Neill [1995]. He observes that
huge investments in human capital by LDCs have not contributed to a convergence in
GDP between LDCs and the industrialized world, and oﬀers an explanation based on
skill-biased technological progress: “The recent shift in production techniques toward
high-skilled labor has resulted in a substantial increase in the returns to education. This
trend, when combined with the large disparities that still exist in education levels be-
tween the developed and less developed countries, has led to an increase in inequality
despite the signiﬁcant reduction in the education gap that has occurred over the last 20
years.” [p.1299]. Our results conﬁrm this explanation: skill-biased technological progress
has shifted the terms of trade against developing countries that produce commodities
with a low capital intensity. For this reason, countries that did not invest in human
capital would have experienced negative productivity growth.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a simple Walrasian model with
imperfect substitution between types of labor and endogenous technological progress.
Section 3 discusses the data and presents the estimation results. Section 4 concludes.
42T h e o r e t i c a l f r a m e w o r k
2.1 The basic structure of the economy
Consider the long run growth path of an economy with physical and human capital,
along the lines of Teulings [1995, 2005]. Workers diﬀer by their education level s,a n d
tasks in the production process diﬀer by their level of complexity c.B o t hs and c vary
continuously along the real domain, so that we have an inﬁnite number of types on both
sides of the market. The supply of skill types s is exogenous in this model. It is assumed
to be normally distributed: s ∼ N (St,V). We analyze the impact of changes in the
average educational attainment of the workforce St on the economy. The variance of
the skill distribution is assumed to be constant over time.
Each s-type worker can perform any c-type task. However, better educated workers
have an absolute advantage: they are more productive in any task. In addition, they have
a comparative advantage in more complex tasks. All markets are perfectly competitive.
We can think of this economy as having two classes of ﬁrms: producers and composers.
A producing ﬁrm produces a single c-type intermediate commodity associated with
that c-type task. It sells its output on the market for intermediate commodities at
am a r k e tp r i c ePt (c) at time t.A c o m p o s i n g ﬁrm buys c-type commodities on the
commodity markets and bundles them in a composite consumption (or investment)
good by a Leontief technology. The c-type commodities are therefore demanded in ﬁxed
proportions.2
Production in a producing ﬁrm of type c is governed by a constant returns to scale




where Yt (c) is production per worker of the intermediate commodities of type c,a n d
Kt (c) is the capital stock per worker. H (c,s) is the productivity of workers with
education level s in a c-type task. For simplicity, we assume that productivity depends
only on the diﬀerence between the skill level of the worker and the complexity level of
the task,
logH (c,s)=h(s − c)
with h0 > 0 and h00 ≤ 0. The restriction h0 > 0 implies absolute advantage: an increase in
s raises productivity in jobs of all complexity levels. The restriction h00 ≤ 0 implies that
the cross derivative of logH (c,s) is positive, yielding comparative advantage of highly
educated workers in complex tasks: the relative productivity gain of an additional unit
of s is increasing in c.
Firms choose the education level of their workers and the level of capital per worker
in order to maximize proﬁts.
Pt (c)Yt (c) − Wt (s) − RKt (c) (2)
2The distinction between two types of ﬁrms is the easiest way to present the model. Alternatively,
one can think of the production process for the consumption good in a single ﬁrm (internalizing the
markets for intermediate products) where all c-type commodities enter directly into the utility function.
These interpretations yield exactly the same results.
5where Wt (s) is the market wage of an s-type worker and R is the rental rate of capital,
w h i c hw ea s s u m et ob ec o n s t a n to v e rt i m e .S i n c ea l lm a r k e t sa r ec o m p e t i t i v e ,ﬁrms take
wages and prices as given. Hence, the ﬁrst-order conditions of a c-type ﬁrm are given
by,
RKt (c)=αPt (c)Yt (c) (3)
W0
t (st (c)) = (1 − α)Pt (c)Yt (c)h0 (st (c) − c) (4)
where st (c) is the education level of the workforce in a c-type ﬁrm in market equilibrium.
The ﬁrst-order condition for capital (3) reﬂects the standard result for a Cobb-
Douglas technology that the rental costs of capital are a ﬁxed share α of output. Free
entry of ﬁrms drives proﬁts to zero, so that equation (2) combined with (3) implies that
Wt (st (c)) = (1 − α)Pt (c)Yt (c) (5)
Using this result, ﬁrst-order condition (4) becomes,
w0
t (st (c)) = h0 (st (c) − c) (6)
where wt (s) ≡ logWt (s).I tc a nb es h o w nt h a th00 ≤ 0 is suﬃcient for the second-order
conditions to be satisﬁed. Equation (6) has a simple interpretation. The left-hand side
is the Mincerian return to human capital, or from the point of view of the ﬁrm, the
relative cost of the marginal unit of education of its workforce. The right-hand side
is the relative increase in labor productivity of the marginal unit of education. The
ﬁrst-order condition states that in equilibrium both have to be equal.
Composing ﬁrms combine the c-type intermediate commodities by a Leontief tech-
nology into the composite consumption (or investment) commodity. Let Yt denote the
aggregate output of this composite commodity (or GDP) per worker. In a ﬁnite number
of types world, a Leontief technology is characterized by a set of coeﬃcients, one for
each intermediate commodity type, indicating how many units of that type are required
to produce one unit of output. In this inﬁnite type world, the coeﬃcients of the Leontief
technology can be represented by a density function divided by an eﬃciency parameter
Ft.Ar i s ei nFt represents skill-neutral technological progress: the same level of input
Yt (c) yields more output Yt. The ratio of the eﬃciency parameter and the density func-
tion of type c indicates how many units of that type are needed for the production of
one unit of output. The distribution of input of intermediate commodities of type c
required for the production of Yt is assumed to be normal c ∼ N (Ct,V). Hence, the
input of type c at time t,d e n o t e dYt (c),i sg i v e nb y ,
Yt (c)=φ
µ






where φ(.) denotes the standard normal density function. The mean of c, Ct,m e a s u r e s
the average complexity level of the production process. A joint increase in both Ct
and Ft is equivalent to skill-biased technological progress: the demand for complex
commodities, in the production of which highly educated workers have a comparative
6advantage, rises relative to the demand for less complex products. The assumption that
t h ev a r i a n c eo fc equals the variance of the skill distribution V is obviously restrictive,
but simpliﬁes the subsequent analysis greatly. We will return to the implications of this
assumption below (see the discussion after equation 11).
Equilibrium on commodity and labor markets in this economy is characterized by
a set of wages Wt (s) and prices Pt (c) and an assignment rule of worker types to tasks
st (c),t h a ts a t i s f yt h ez e r o - p r o ﬁt condition (5), the ﬁrst-order condition (6), and market
clearing on the market for tasks of each complexity level. Market clearing requires
that the demand for each c-type task equals its supply. Demand is given by expression
(7). Supply equals the supply of workers of type st (c) who produce that c-type task,
multiplied by their productivity H (c,st (c)) in producing that commodity. Substituting
the normal density functions for the distributions of s and c and taking logarithms, the
market clearing condition can be written as,





= h(st (c) − c) − 1
2





where yt =l o g Yt.T h e ﬁnal term on the right-hand side, logs0
t (c), is the log of the
Jacobian dst (c)/dc = s0
t (c) for the transfer from a density function in skill levels st (c)
on the right-hand side to a density function in complexity levels c on the left-hand side.
The term −1
2 logV of the log normal density cancels on both sides because the variances
are equal.
For this special case where the variances of the education and the complexity distri-
butions are equal, diﬀerential equation (8) has an analytical solution:3
st (c)=c − Ct + St (9)
Two observations are in place here. First, better skilled workers are assigned to more
complex tasks, s0
t (c) > 0. This is what one would expect, since they have a comparative
advantage in these tasks. Second, holding c constant, the education level of a worker
doing a c-type task rises when the mean education level of the workforce St goes up,
and falls when the average complexity of the production process Ct rises. Aggregate log
output per capita is found by substituting (9) into diﬀerential equation (8):4
yt = h(St − Ct)+l o gFt (10)
3The initial condition that yields a unique solution to diﬀerential equation (8) is given by a transver-
sality condition: for any other solution limc→∞ st (c)=s<∞ (implying that worker types s>s are not
employed), limc↑c st (c)=∞ (so that there are no workers left to do tasks c>c), limc→−∞ st (c)=s,
or limc↓c = −∞, all of which violate market clearing.
4In a previous version of this paper [Teulings and Van Rens 2003, section 2.1.2] we show that Ct can
be endogenized by letting composing ﬁrms choose the average complexity level of inputs; i.e. logFt =
f (Ct,t). Ct is increasing in St due to the comparative advantage of high-skilled workers in more complex
jobs: the higher the average level of education, the lower the return to human capital and the cheaper
is the production of education-intensive high c-tasks, raising the proﬁtability of high Ct technologies.
This is consistent with Caselli and Coleman’s [2002] ﬁnding of a positive correlation between computer
use and the average education level of a country’s workforce. When the cross-derivative of f is positive,
f12 > 0, the model displays skill-biased technological progress.
7As noted earlier, a joint increase in Ft and Ct represents skill-biased technological change,
whereas an increase in Ft that does not aﬀect Ct is skill-neutral technological progress.
2.2 Diminishing returns to education
What are the implications of this model for the return to education? Substitution of the
equilibrium assignment rule (9) into equation (6) yields an expression for the evolution
of the Mincerian return to human capital
w0
t (s)=w0
t = h0 (St − Ct) (11)
Equation (11) shows that the private rate of return to education, w0
t does not depend on
s.H e n c e ,wt (s) is linear in s. The implication that log wages depend linearly on years of
schooling is consistent with a large body of evidence from the labor literature (see Card
[1999] for an overview). In the context of the current model, the result depends crucially
on the assumption that the variances of the education and complexity distributions are
equal. Because of this feature, s0
t (c)=1for all St and Ct, so that the term logs0
t (c)
drops out of equation (8) and h(st (c) − c) is a constant independent of c.O n e c a n
show that when the variance of the skill distribution is greater then the variance of the
distribution of complexity levels, the Mincer equation is concave, and in the opposite
case it is convex [Teulings 2005]. There is a simple intuition for this result. A larger
variance of the skill distribution makes skill types around the median scarcer compared
to types in the tails of the distribution. Hence, wages in the middle go up and wages in
the tails go down. The assumption that the Mincer equation is linear is important for
the interpretation of our empirical results.
The social rate of return to education is obtained by taking the derivative of equation




t = h0 (St − Ct)=w0
t (12)
The social return to education equals the private return. This is what one would expect
in a Walrasian world where all markets are perfectly competitive.
The private and social returns to education vary with the average education level of
the workforce. The derivative of expression (12) immediately shows that the assumption
that h00 ≤ 0 implies that the returns to education are diminishing. This result is due
to the imperfect substitution between various s-types. The more negative h00,t h el e s s
substitutable are workers with diﬀerent education levels, and the stronger is the general
equilibrium eﬀect on the return to education.5
5The testable implication of diminishing returns to education is that the second-order eﬀect of edu-
cation on GDP is negative. However, this interpretation of the second-order eﬀect relies on the linearity
of the Mincer equation (11) in s. If the Mincer equation were concave, the second-order eﬀect of St on
log GDP would be negative even if worker types were perfect substitutes. Then, the declining return
is due to a movement along the curve wt(s), instead of a movement of the curve itself. However, since
there is abundant evidence from microdata on the linearity of the Mincerian earnings function, we shall
interpret our estimation results under this assumption.
8A summary statistic for the degree of substitution between worker types is the com-
pression elasticity γ.I ti sd e ﬁned as the percentage reduction in the return to human










The numerator in the ﬁrst expression is the relative change in the return to education; the
denominator is the relative change in the value of the stock of human capital, evaluated
at its current rate of return w0
t. For the standard case where there are only two types
of workers, the compression elasticity relates to the elasticity of substitution between





where Dt denotes the variance of log wages. Using Katz and Murphy’s [1992] estimate
(from US time series) of ηlow-high =1 .4 or Ciccone and Peri’s [2005] estimate (from
variation across US states) of 1.5 and using a typical value for wage dispersion in the
United States of Dt ∼ = 0.36, the compression elasticity is of the order of magnitude of 2
for the United States. We will use equations (13) and (14) to compare our estimates for
the degree of substitution between worker types with Katz and Murphy’s results.
In summary, the basic model yields the following testable implications: the private
and the social return to education are equal, and both are negatively related to the
average level of education in the economy, due to imperfect substitution between worker
t y p e s . H e n c e ,t h es i z eo ft h i sn e g a t i v ee ﬀect can be used as an estimate of degree of
substitution between worker types.
2.3 Endogenous technological progress
In the long run, an increase in the average education level in a country may aﬀect the
private and social returns to education in ways not described by our static model. A
leading possibility is that the higher education level of the workforce spurs investments
in new technologies, which we have so far treated as exogenous. This would be the case
if the production of knowledge is more human capital intensive than the production of
the consumption good, as in Uzawa [1965], Lucas [1988] and Barro and Sala-i-Martin
[1999, chapter 5]. There may also be externalities in knowledge production, so that
investments in new technologies by one ﬁrm beneﬁto t h e rﬁrms as well. In this section
we consider the predictions of an extension to the basic model, in which composing
ﬁrms can invest in new technologies by allocating a fraction of their workforce to the
production of knowledge.6
We ﬁrst discuss the long run eﬀects of a change in the average level of education of
the workforce St. In steady state, the level of technological development must be such
6A formal discussion can be found in a previous version of this paper [Teulings and Van Rens 2003,
section 2.2].
9that the cost of an additional unit of investment in knowledge equals the annuity value
of revenues from that investment. If there are externalities in knowledge production,
t h e nt h ec o s to fi n v e s t i n gm o r ei nk n o w l e d g em u s tb ee q u a lt ot h ep r i v a t er e v e n u ef o r
the investing ﬁrm. The steady state stock of knowledge is increasing in the average level
of education in the workforce. The reason is that, conditional on the level of technology,
a higher level of education implies a lower return to human capital w0,s ot h a ti ti sl e s s
costly to use high skilled workers to develop new technologies.
The long run social return to education consists of two parts: the direct eﬀect of
education on output and the indirect eﬀect through the higher steady state level of
technology. Unlike in the basic model, the long run social return to education exceeds
the private return, even if there are no spillovers in the production of new technologies.
This result simply reﬂects the return on investments in new knowledge. In the presence
of knowledge spillovers, the social return exceeds the private return by even more, since
every ﬁrm beneﬁts from the investment of all other ﬁrms.
Contrary to the basic model, the long run eﬀect of an increase in the average level
of education on the private return to education is not necessarily negative. The coun-
teracting mechanism is similar to that in Acemoglu [2002]: a greater supply of human
capital induces investments in new technology. If these innovations to technology are
skill-biased, they raise the private return to human capital. Depending on the degree
of skill bias, the increase in the private return because of technological progress may be
smaller or larger than the direct decrease in the return because of the increased supply
of human capital. The net long run eﬀect of the average education level on the private
return to schooling is an empirical question.
Now consider the transition dynamics. Suppose the economy is initially in a steady
state equilibrium, when the average level of education St permanently increases by one
year. Since the current level of technological development is too low compared to the new
steady state, ﬁrms immediately start investing in knowledge production. And because
knowledge production is relatively skill intensive, this raises the demand for human
capital and therefore its return. Compared to the basic model, the negative immediate
eﬀect of an increase in the supply of human capital on the private return to schooling
is partly oﬀset by an increase in the demand for education for the investment in new
knowledge. The net eﬀect of both forces is ambiguous, depending on the degree of skill
intensity of knowledge production. Notice that the reason for the ambiguity is diﬀerent
for the ambiguity in the sign of the long run response. In the short run, the skill intensity
of investment in new knowledge counteracts the standard substitution eﬀect. In the long
run, the skill bias of new technologies is the counteracting force.
Like the eﬀect on the private return, the immediate eﬀect of an increase in the level
of human capital on the social return to education is also counteracted by increased
investments in new technologies. The sign of the net eﬀect on the social return is again
ambiguous, but the short run social return is unambiguously smaller than the private
return. The reason is that some workers are assigned to knowledge production and are
no longer available for current production.7
7Notice that there is an accounting issue whether or not GDP includes knowledge production. Since
10Summarizing, in a dynamic extension to the model with endogenous technological
progress, the short run responses to an increase in the average education level in a
country of both the private and the social return are ambiguous, but the social rate
of return must be smaller than the private return because more workers are allocated
to knowledge production, which does not immediately contribute to output. In the
subsequent transition path, GDP rises unambiguously, while the private rate of return
can either rise or fall, depending on which eﬀect dominates: the increasing level of
(skill-biased) technological development or the lower level of investment in knowledge.
3 Empirical evidence
3.1 Direct evidence on the private return to education
Before turning to our main estimation results, we present some direct evidence for im-
perfect substitution between worker types because our empirical strategy relies crucially
on this assumption. We assume that if workers of diﬀerent education levels are im-
perfect substitutes, an increase in the supply of human capital will decrease its return.
Linearizing equation (11) we get,
w0
jt = α1 − α2Sjt (15)
where j indexes countries. We estimate equation (15) using a cross-country sample of
private returns to education estimated from microdata by various authors and compiled
by Bils and Klenow [2000]. The estimates in table I show a clear negative relationship
between the return to education and the average schooling level in a country. The crucial
coeﬃcient α2 is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Based on these estimates, the private return to education is about 15% for countries
with an education level of zero, and decreases by about 0.7% for every additional year
of education. The private rate of return to education is 11% at the sample average
education level in 1990 (5.3 years), while it is 7% for the US, with an average education
level of 12 years. The parameter estimates for α1 and α2 can be used to calculate the
compression elasticity as a measure of the degree of imperfection in the substitution










For α2Sjt <α 1, the compression elasticity is monotonically increasing in the average
education level Sjt. The compression elasticity equals 0.60 for the average education
level in 1990, and 3.44 for the United States. The latter number is similar to the value
of 2 based on Katz and Murphy’s [1992] and Ciccone and Peri’s [2005] estimates of
the elasticity of substitution between high school and college graduates for the US, see
it seems that these investments are largely non-tangible, we assume that at least part of knowledge
production is not counted as output.
11equation (14). These conclusions do not change if we weight countries by log GDP per
worker as in column (2) or eliminate the outlier Jamaica, see column (3).
Because the estimates in table I are based on cross-sectional variation between coun-
tries only, they have several limitations. First, since we have only one estimate for the
return to schooling in each country, we cannot control for diﬀerences across countries.
For example, if institutions to protect property rights further the accumulation of hu-
man capital and also reduce rent extraction, it is impossible to disentangle these two
eﬀects on the return to education from the cross-sectional variation alone. Second, a
cross-section does not allow for inferences about the dynamics of the eﬀect of education
on its return. Hence, in the remainder of this section we focus on an analysis of wage
dispersion and GDP, for which panel data are available.
3.2 Empirical speciﬁcation for inequality and GDP
The accumulation of human capital reduces its return, thereby compressing the wage
distribution. But education clearly is not the only factor yielding wage diﬀerentials
between workers. Therefore, we extend the Mincer equation to allow for other worker
characteristics,
wjt(s,u)=α0jt + w0
jts + σu (17)
where u is a standard normal random variable representing other worker characteristics
and σ is their standard deviation. Let V be the variance of years of schooling s,a n dρ
the correlation between s and other worker characteristics u. Then, the variance of log
wages, or wage dispersion, Djt is given by
Djt = w02
jtV +2 ρσw0
jtV 1/2 + σ2
We use equation (15) to substitute for w0
jt and get the following expression for wage
dispersion,




1V +2 α1V 1/2σρ+ σ2
θ1 ≡ 2α2α1V +2 α2V 1/2σρ
θ2 ≡ α2
2V
I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a tb o t hθ1 and θ2 would be zero if α2 =0 ,a n dap r o p e rt e s t
of perfect substitution between workers types is to test the joint restriction θ1 = θ2 =0 .
The θ parameters depend on the variance of the education distribution V ,w h i c hw ea s -
sume to be constant over time and across countries. It is diﬃcult to provide a structural
model including the eﬀect of variation in V , because in that case the Mincer equation is
no longer linear (see Teulings [2005]). Instead, we adopt a pragmatic approach, adding
an additive control term θ3Vjt to equation (18). If we assume that capital income is
proportional to labor income, so that the log wage distribution and the log income distri-
bution diﬀer only by their ﬁrst moment, then equation (18) holds for income inequality
as well. The equation can then be estimated using panel data on income inequality.
12We allow for dynamics in the eﬀect of Sjt on Djt and yjt, and estimate,8
Djt = θ0t − θ1Sjt + θ2S2
jt + θ3Vjt + ¯ θ1Sjt−1 − ¯ θ2S2
jt−1 − ¯ θ3Vjt + φDjt−1 + ujt(19)
yjt = β0t + β1Sjt − 1
2β2S2
jt − ¯ β1Sjt−1 + 1
2
¯ β2S2
jt−1 + ψyjt−1 + vjt (20)
where ujt and vjt are error terms. We allow θ0t and β0t to vary over time in order
to account for (skill-neutral) technological progress.9 The (short run) social return to
education,
y0
jt = β1 − β2Sjt (21)
is easily comparable to expression (15) for the private return, w0
jt = α1 − α2Sjt.T h e
short run ﬁrst-order eﬀect of an increase in Sjt on inequality and output is given by
θ1 and β1 respectively, and the long run eﬀects can be calculated as
¡





β1 − ¯ β1
¢
/(1 − ψ). The short and long run eﬀects are equal if ¯ θ1 = φθ1 for the
private return or ¯ β1 = ψβ1 for the social return. If the short and the long run return
to education are not equal to each other, that would be evidence in favor of endogenous
technological progress as discussed in section 2.3.
Finally, consider the role of physical capital in a regression such as (20). The Cobb-
Douglas production function (1) with equal shares of capital α for each c-type producing
ﬁrm, generates the standard result that the rental costs of capital are a ﬁxed share α of
output as in ﬁrst-order condition (3). Aggregating over all ﬁrms, this implies that log
aggregate capital diﬀers from log GDP only by a constant:
kt = yt +l o gα − r
Hence, we cannot establish the contribution of human and physical capital to production
by directly estimating the log of an aggregate version of the production function (1),
since log physical capital kt and log human capital h(St − Ct) are perfectly collinear.
Although this is probably an extreme case, which depends on the speciﬁc assumptions
about the production function and the return to capital r being constant, it helps to
understand an actual empirical problem. Given the collinearity of K and H and the
presence of measurement error in both variables, the relative magnitudes of the coeﬃ-
cients of both factor inputs merely reﬂect the relative precision of their measurement.
Krueger and Lindahl [2001] argue that capital data are correlated to output by construc-
tion, since investment data are used to construct both series. Hence, the measurement
e r r o ri nb o t hs e r i e si sl i k e l yt ob ec o r r e l a t e d .T h i se x p l a i n sw h yt h e yﬁnd α to be much
higher than one would expect based on conventional estimates of the capital share in
output of about 0.35. Our estimates of (20) including capital as an explanatory variable
conﬁrm this ﬁnding. Consequently, we omit capital in most of our regressions and apply
the reduced-form equation (20) in our preferred speciﬁcations.10
8Notice that equation (20) for GDP can be rewritten in error correction form as
















jt−1 − (1 − ψ)yjt−1 + vjt
This speciﬁcation is a growth regression, which has been estimated many times in the literature.
9We also estimated versions of (19) and (20), in which θ1, ¯ θ1, β1,a n d¯ β1 are allowed to be time-
varying, in order to account for (exogenous) skill-biased technological progress.
10Alternatively, we could ﬁxt h ec o e ﬃcient for capital to some value, as Krueger and Lindahl [2001]
133.3 Identiﬁcation and estimation
A serious problem in the estimation of equation (20) for GDP and (19) for wage dis-
persion is reverse causation: does a rise in education cause growth in GDP, or does
growth cause rising educational attainment? Our approach to this problem is to use
the dynamic structure of the eﬀects. In particular, we assume that contemporaneous
changes in GDP do not aﬀect the average education level of the workforce in that same
observation period. We follow Krueger and Lindahl [2001] and use a ten-year timeframe
to alleviate the measurement error bias in the coeﬃcient on ∆Sjt. To interpret our
estimates, we therefore need to assume that a change in GDP takes at least ten years
to aﬀect the average education level in a country. There are several reasons to believe
this is a realistic assumption. It takes time before an increase in GDP leads to an in-
crease in the budget of the education system. Then, it takes time to actually build new
schools and train new teachers. Finally, the new generation of students that beneﬁts
from the increased expenditures on schooling takes time to ﬁnish school and enter the
labor market.
Another problem is the possibility that there are time-varying third factors that
aﬀect both the level of GDP and human capital formation, e.g. better institutions for
the protection of property rights. If these factors have an immediate eﬀect on human
capital formation and a delayed eﬀect on GDP some ten years later, then we would
conclude incorrectly that the increase in education was responsible for the rise in GDP.
Although we cannot rule out this possibility, we are not aware of time-varying variables
that have been shown to have a strong impact on GDP. The quality of institutions tends
to be quite persistent. The particular time pattern that is needed for these variables to
cause bias in our estimates makes it even less likely that this is a serious concern.
Estimating (19) and (20) by OLS is consistent and eﬃcient if the error terms are
true innovations. However, the problem becomes more complicated if we want to allow
for country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. For clarity of exposition, focus on equation (20) for
GDP, and suppose that,
vjt = fj + εjt
where fj is the ﬁxed country eﬀect and εjt is an innovation in GDP. The assumption on
t h et i m el a gi nt h er e v e r s ee ﬀect of GDP on education implies
E [Sjt−sεjt]=0 for s ≥ 0
Clearly, OLS is inconsistent in this case, because yj,t−1 is correlated with fj.F i r s td i ﬀer-
encing the equation eliminates the ﬁxed eﬀect, but now the component εj,t−1 in ∆εjt is
correlated with ∆yj,t−1 (and possibly also with ∆Sjt via the reverse causation equation).
do. Which procedure is most eﬃcient depends on the type of deviations of the assumptions one thinks
are most relevant. If there is measurement error in the capital data or if the capital share is constant over
time, but varies between countries, then omitting capital as an explanatory variable is most eﬃcient. If
the long run return to capital varies over time, it is preferrable to set the contribution of capital to some
ﬁxed value. Both methods fail if the capital share varies both between and within countries. We tried
both approaches and found little diﬀerence in the results.
14A consistent and eﬃcient GMM estimator uses the following moment conditions:
E [yjt−s∆εjt]=0for s ≥ 2
E [Sjt−s∆εjt]=0for s ≥ 1
These moment conditions give rise to the dynamic panel data estimator set out in
Arellano and Bond [1991] and applied to the growth literature starting from Caselli
et al. [1996].11 Because the regressors in this paper include not only education but
also education squared, we include lags of both education and education squared in the
instrument set.
Since we use ten year time intervals, the time dimension of our panel is very short
(at most ﬁve periods), so that our estimates using this estimator are imprecise. As
shown by Blundell and Bond [1998], we can realize a substantial eﬃciency gain if we
are prepared to make the additional assumption that the country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect in
GDP is uncorrelated with innovations in the education level:
E [fj∆Sjt]=0
Notice that this assumption is much weaker than E [fjSjt]=0 .I ta l l o w st h eﬁxed eﬀect
in GDP to aﬀect the level of education, but not its growth rate. Under this assumption,
two additional sets of moment conditions are available:
E [vjt∆yjt−s]=0for s ≥ 1
E [vjt∆Sjt−s]=0for s ≥ 0
These additional moment conditions give rise to the Blundell-Bond system estimator.12
Because output is highly persistent, the instruments in the Arellano-Bond estimator
are weak, so that the estimator is biased in ﬁnite samples (Blundell and Bond [1998],
Hahn, Hausman and Kuersteiner [2004]). Bond et al. [2001] reestimate the dynamic
growth regressions in Caselli et al. and show that in the cross-country growth context,
the estimator is indeed poorly behaved. For this reason, they advocate the use of the
Blundell-Bond system estimator for panel growth regressions.
3.4 Data sources
We draw data from four sources: the Barro and Lee [2000, 1996, 1993] data on edu-
cational attainment, the World Income Inequality Database [UNU-WIDER 2005], the
Penn World Table [Heston, Summers and Aten 2002] for GDP per worker and the data
on capital constructed by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare [2005]. The last update of the
Barro and Lee dataset contains detailed data on educational attainment for 142 coun-
tries for the period 1960-2000 in intervals of ﬁve years. Barro and Lee report the fraction
11Islam [1995] also argues in favor of controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects in growth regressions. However, the
estimator used in that paper assumes strict exogeneity (rather than predeterminedness) of the regressors.
12We implement this estimator using Roodman’s [2005] xtabond2 module for Stata. For earlier ver-
sions of the paper we also used the Ox package by Doornik et al. [2002] and Bond’s DPD software for
Gauss.
15of the population that attained a certain education level, as well as the average duration
of this education level. They use these data to construct the average education level
of the population in years. We also calculate a rough estimate of the variance of the
education distribution.13
Measurement error is a serious problem in all data on educational attainment, in-
cluding the Barro and Lee dataset (see Krueger and Lindahl [2001]). De la Fuente and
Doménech [2001] improved the data for 21 OECD countries by using previously unex-
plored sources and by removing sharp breaks in the data. These authors avoid the use
of enrollment data. But their data have two drawbacks: the small number of countries
and the rather ad hoc choices the authors have to make when correcting unexplainable
breaks in time series.14 Cohen and Soto [2001] extend De la Fuente and Doménech’s
work to several other countries (contrary to De la Fuente and Doménech however, they
use enrollment data when needed). They construct education data for 95 countries,
trying to “minimize the extrapolations and keep the data as close as possible to those
directly available from national censuses.” Portela, Alessie, and Teulings [2004] address
the adequacy of the perpetual inventory method in the Barro and Lee data directly.
They ﬁnd clear evidence for a large and systematic bias in the data points constructed
by the perpetual inventory method and develop a statistical procedure to correct for
this bias. However, they also show that for the same growth regressions as used in this
paper, using original or corrected data makes little diﬀerence. In light of this conclusion,
we use the original Barro and Lee data.
The World Income Inequality Database (WIID) data on income inequality were taken
from a large number of studies and assessed on their comparability and the quality of
the estimates. We use the new quality label provided in version 2.0a of the WIID, which
combines and improves the quality ratings in the Deininger and Squire [1996] data with
older versions of the WIID. We use only data for which the underlying concepts of income
and income receiving units are known, and for which the quality of the concepts and the
survey is judged to be suﬃcient in terms of coverage, questionnaires and data collection.
13Barro and Lee calculate average years of education from attainment data (percentage of the pop-
ulation that have attained a certain level of schooling) combined with data on the typical duration of
each level of schooling [1996, p.218]. We can express the calculation as:
S = fprimSprim + fsec (Dprim + Ssec)+fhigh (Dprim + Dsec + Shigh)
where S is average years of schooling in the total population, flevel is the fraction of the population
that has attained a certain education level (no education, primary education, secondary education or
higher education), Dlevel is the typical duration of the diﬀerent education levels, and Slevel is the average
duration of a certain education level for those people that have not continued to attain a higher education
level. Intuitively, Slevel <D level due to early drop-out. The calculation of average years of schooling in
this expression is just an expected value, which suggests the following proxy for the variance in education
within each country, cf. Checchi [2004]:
V (S)=fprimS
2
prim + fsec (Dprim + Ssec)
2 + fhigh (Dprim + Dsec + Shigh)
2 − S
2
14De la Fuente and Doménech are aware of these problems and admit that “the construction of our
series involves a fair amount of guesswork”.
16For this reason, the number of observations included for some countries is smaller than
in the Deininger and Squire [1996] data, even though the time period covered is much
longer. We thus address Atkinson and Brandolini’s [2001] criticisms about the quality
and consistency of the earlier datasets as well as we can. We discuss the Atkinson-
Brandolini critique in more detail when we present our estimation results in section
3.5. When the inequality data contain missing values, we construct data for ten year
intervals from 1960 to 2000 by linear inter- and extrapolation with a maximum span of
two years from an actual datapoint.15 We calculated the variance of log income from
the Gini coeﬃcients, assuming that log income is distributed normally (see appendix
A). Table II provides summary statistics for the variables in the combined dataset.16
3.5 Estimates of the private return from inequality data
Table III presents estimates of equation (19). Since the data on income inequality are
not fully comparable across countries and years, we control for diﬀerences in the way
the Gini is calculated. In particular, we include dummy variables to control for the unit
of analysis in the underlying microdata (household or person), the income deﬁnition
used to calculate the Gini coeﬃcient (gross income, disposable income or consumption),
the income share unit (family or household) and the equivalence scale used vary across
diﬀerent observations.
In columns (1) through (4) we present estimates of the model without controlling for
ﬁxed country eﬀects. Column (2) adds the variance of education, column (3) introduces
the second-order eﬀect of education and column (4) weighs observations by log GDP
per worker. In all these regressions, the education variables are jointly insigniﬁcant.
Moreover, in the presence of ﬁxed eﬀects, the estimate of the long run return is biased
upward because correlation of the lagged dependent variable Dt−1 with the ﬁxed eﬀect
biases its coeﬃcient towards one.
In columns (5), (6) and (7) we control for country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, identifying
the estimates only oﬀ the variation in inequality within countries over time. In these re-
gressions, the education variables are jointly signiﬁcant and all have the sign expected on
the basis of our model. The within-group estimator in column (5) is inconsistent and un-
derestimates the coeﬃcient on Dt−1.17 Column (6) presents the consistent and eﬃcient
system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond [1998]. The Sargan/Hansen
test cannot reject the overidentifying restrictions of the system estimator (p-value is
100%) and the Arellano-Bond tests detect ﬁrst-order autocorrelation in the error terms
(p-value is 7%) but do not ﬁnd evidence for higher order autocorrelation (p-value 37%
for second-order), as we would expect if the system estimator is correctly speciﬁed.
15We only interpolate between observations that were calculated from the same source by the same




p+qxt+p,w h e r ep is the time span to the next
observation and q ≤ 2 is the time span from the previous observation. For extrapolation we use the
nearest observation (at most two years apart). This procedure is eﬃcient if the Gini follows a random
walk, as is almost true empirically.
16The complete dataset as well as the Stata codes used to create it are available from the authors.
17In addition, the standard errors are biased downward because taking deviations from country means
introduces autocorrelation in the error term.
17In column (7) we explore whether our estimates are sensitive to poor comparability of
the inequality data within countries. As pointed out by Atkinson and Brandolini [2001],
additive dummy variables may be insuﬃcient to control for changes in deﬁnitions of
the Gini coeﬃcient. We therefore reestimated the model, including separate dummy
variables for all observations with a deﬁnitional change. Thanks to improvements in
the WIID data and because we constructed the data so as to minimize the number
of deﬁnitional changes within a country, the estimates are not very sensitive to this
robustness check. We also tested whether the results are driven by outliers by excluding
various groups of countries from the sample and found the estimates to be robust to this
exercise as well.18
For all speciﬁcations that include both education and education squared, we calculate
the implied short and long run (private) return to schooling at the sample average
of 6.3 years of education. The calculation of the return to education requires values
for the variance of the education distribution V , the correlation between education
and other worker characteristics ρ, and the variance of those characteristics σ2,s e e
equation (18). An estimate for V can be found in table II: V ∼ = 19.3 in 2000. Since
we do not have reliable estimates for ρ and σ2, the subsequent calculations are based
on ρ =0 .19 Despite the small number of observations, the estimates of the short run
return are signiﬁcant and robust across speciﬁcations. The estimates of the long run
return are less reliable, in part because the coeﬃcient estimates for the lagged education
variables are not as precise, but mostly because the long run return is very sensitive
to the coeﬃcient on lagged inequality, which is imprecisely estimated and varies across
speciﬁcations. However, none of the models reveal signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
long and the short run private return, with p-values never below 36% and much higher
for the speciﬁcations that control for ﬁxed eﬀects. Hence, the data do not support
Acemoglu’s [2002] hypothesis that an increase in the supply of human capital induces so
much skill-biased technological change that the long run eﬀect on the return to education
is positive. Contrary to this hypothesis, we ﬁnd that the long run eﬀect of a rise in the
average education level is not an increase, but a compression of wage diﬀerentials. The
equality of the long run and the short run private return to education can be consistent
with both the basic and the extended version of our model - the latter if the upward
pressure due to the increase in the stock of knowledge exactly oﬀsets the downward
pressure due to the decline in investment in new knowledge.
We take the estimates in column (6), which are consistent in the presence of country-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects on inequality, as our benchmark. By equation (19), the estimates
imply α1 =0 .27 and α2 =0 .020. These parameter values imply a private return at
18T h e s er e s u l t sa r eo m i t t e dh e r ef o rb r e v i t yb u tm a y be found in an earlier version of this paper
[Teulings and Van Rens 2003].
19Ruling out ρ<0,t h i sp r o v i d e sal o w e rb o u n do nt h ee ﬀect of education on wage dispersion







An upper bound can be found by setting ρ =1and σ
2 e q u a lt ot h et o t a lv a r i a n c eo fl o gw a g e s :
σ = D
1/2
t ' 0.62 from table II. In that case V
−1/2σρ ' 0.16, a bit smaller than the implied value for α1
of 0.27. Hence, setting ρ =0will not greatly aﬀect the conclusions.
18the average education level of 6.3 years in 2000 of 14% and a compression elasticity of
γ =0 .96 by equations (15) and (16). For the US, where the average education level is 12
years, the implied private return is 3%. This estimate is unreasonably low most likely
due to the fact that the US has an extremely high education level compared to other
countries in the sample. This makes the estimated return less reliable, as it depends
more heavily on the estimate of the higher order terms.
Because we ﬁnd no evidence of a dynamic pattern in the response of the private
rate of return to a shock in the mean level of education, the estimates in table III are
comparable to the cross-section evidence presented in table I. The implied returns to
education in table III are somewhat lower than those in table I for countries with high
levels of education and somewhat higher for countries with low education levels, but
both estimates yield comparable numbers. If there is skill-biased technological change
over the sample period, the coeﬃcients θ1 and ¯ θ1 in (19) are not constant over time.
We allowed for time-variation in the coeﬃcients on education and education lagged, but
found that this makes little diﬀerence for the estimates.20
The eﬀect of the variance of the education distribution on income inequality is in-
signiﬁcant and small: a one standard deviation increase in V (6 years2 in 2000) decreases
income inequality by 0.0138,l e s st h a n0.06 of a standard deviation. This suggests that
the composition eﬀect of a reduced variance of schooling on the income distribution is
less important than the compression eﬀect due to imperfect substitutability of types of
labor, which is the main focus of this paper.21 H o w e v e r ,s i n c ew eo n l yh a v ear o u g h
proxy for Vt,t h el o wc o e ﬃcient might also be due to attenuation bias.
Our analysis of the private rate of return to education based on inequality data
leads to the following conclusions: (i)o n c ec o u n t r y - s p e c i ﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects are taken into
account, there is strong evidence for imperfect substitution between workers of diﬀerent
education levels, (ii) the compression elasticity is in line with Katz and Murphy’s [1992]
estimate for the US, (iii) the implied private return is consistent with evidence from
microdata in diﬀerent countries, and (iv) the long run eﬀect of an increase in the average
education level on the private return approximately equals the short run eﬀect and is
negative, contradicting Acemoglu’s [2002] hypothesis of overshooting.
3.6 Estimates of the social return from GDP data
Estimation results for equation (20) are reported in table IV. Column (1) replicates
Krueger and Lindahl [2001, table 3]. The results diﬀer slightly because of our longer
time series. The short run social return to education of 8% is roughly equal to our
estimate of the private return. The long run return is about seven times higher than the
short run eﬀect and exceeds by far any estimate of the Mincerian rate. However, the long
20The implied short run return to schooling goes down from 9.4% to 7.9% for 2000 and the long run
return increases from 8.8% to 9.8%. The diﬀerence between the two is insigniﬁcant and the interaction
t e r m sa r ea l li n d i v i d u a l l ya sw e l la sj o i n t l yi n s i g n i ﬁcant (p-value 94%).
21In the context of the model this ﬁnding makes sense: the sign of the eﬀect of Vt on Dt is ambiguous,
since a fall in Vt raises w
0
t (see Teulings [2005]). Whether the direct composition eﬀect or the indirect
general equilibrium eﬀect dominates depends on the parameters of the model.
19run eﬀect takes a very long time to materialize because the coeﬃcient of lagged GDP
is close to unity. Column (2) adds the second-order eﬀect in education. Its coeﬃcient
has the expected negative sign and is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Again, the long run
social return to education exceeds the short run return by a factor of about seven. These
results are virtually unaltered when observations are weighted by log GDP per worker,
as in column (3). Column (4) adds capital per worker as an explanatory variable. The
coeﬃcient for capital per worker is larger than conventional estimates for the capital
share of production and the education variables become insigniﬁcant, individually as
well as jointly. The results conﬁrm the analysis in section 3.2 that the eﬀects of human
and physical capital on GDP are hard to disentangle. Given our conclusion that omitting
physical capital does not bias the estimates of the social rate of return, we do not include
the physical capital in the rest of our regressions.
Columns (5), (6) and (7) control for country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Column (5) reports
the simple OLS estimator, which is inconsistent and underestimates the coeﬃcient on
the lagged dependent variable; and columns (6) and (7) present system GMM estimates.
The Sargan/Hansen test borderline rejects the overidentifying restrictions in column (6)
at the 3% level. In column (7), we add cross eﬀects of time and education, taking
2000 as a point of reference for the return to education. These cross eﬀects capture
skill-biased technological progress and Tinbergen’s [1975] race between education and
technology. As time goes by, and keeping constant the average level of education of the
workforce, the return to education rises. However, the steady increase in the average
level of education over the postwar period in most countries has oﬀset this upward
trend in the return to education, as can be seen from the negative second-order eﬀect of
education on GDP. The strong eﬀect of skill-biased technological progress can be seen
by comparing the ﬁrst-order coeﬃcients for education in columns (6) and (7). In column
(6), that coeﬃcient measures the average return to education at St =0over the whole
estimation period. In column (7), the same coeﬃcient is the return in the year 2000.
The estimate in column (7) is 18 percentage points higher than that in column (6). The
point estimates for the interaction terms indicate that, holding education levels constant,
the global return to education would have risen by about 1.7 percentage points in the
1970s, by 2.1 percentage points in the 80s and would have remained constant in the 90s.
The interaction terms are jointly signiﬁcant (p-value 0.02), and adding these interaction
eﬀects leads to the Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying moment restrictions no longer
rejecting the model (p-value 63%). For both columns (6) and (7), there is ﬁrst-order,
but not higher order autocorrelation, as expected if the system estimator is correctly
speciﬁed.22
We ﬁrst discuss the implications of our estimates for the short run social return. In
this discussion, we take the estimates in column (6) as a point of reference for compar-
ison with the results on inequality.23 T h ee s t i m a t ef o rt h es h o r tr u ns o c i a lr e t u r nt o
22The p-values for these tests are given in the caption of table IV.
23A concern in comparing the estimates in table IV with those in table III is that the estimation
samples are not the same because for many countries reliable inequality data are not available. The
summary statistics in the last column of table II conﬁrm that countries with higher GDP and education
levels are overrepresented in the inequality sample. However, because we use a non-linear speciﬁcation
20education, β1 =0 .28, is very close to the average private return, α1 =0 .27. For coun-
tries with high education levels, the short run social return is a bit lower than the private
return, with β2 =0 .031 >α 2 =0 .020 although the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant.24 At the
average education level in our sample in the year 2000, these estimates imply a social
return to education of 8%. The results show clear evidence for the second-order eﬀect
of education on GDP, which is signiﬁcant at the 5% level, conﬁrming the hypothesis of
imperfect substitution between workers of diﬀerent education levels. The implication is
that investments in a better educated workforce have a much stronger eﬀect on GDP
growth in low St countries. If high St countries grow faster than countries with lower
education levels, it must be because of skill bias in technological progress, which shifts
technological progress to their advantage (cf. O’Neill [1995]).
T u r n i n gt ot h el o n gr u ne ﬀects, it becomes clear why it is important to control for
exogenous skill-biased technological progress. The rate of convergence implied by the
estimates in column (6) is 0.6% per year, but increases to the much more reasonable
value of 3.6% per year in column (7). The latter estimate is consistent with the 2 to 4%
annual convergence found by Bond et al. [2001].25 Skill-biased technological progress
implies divergence, as it allows countries with high education levels to grow faster, and
failing to control for this eﬀect biases the rate of convergence downward. The implied
long run social return, evaluated at the average education level of 6.3 years in 2000,
is about 42%, much higher than the private return. This is suggestive of endogenous
technological progress as described in section 2.3. However, it takes several decades
before a substantial part of the surplus of the long run over the short run return is
actually realized. The point estimate for the long run return should be interpreted with
care because it is very sensitive to the rate of convergence. Bond et al. [2001] note that
there is “a great deal of uncertainty in measuring convergence rates” (p.22). Moreover,
the long run eﬀects are more prone to possible reverse causation.
How do our estimates for the social return ﬁt into the global picture of post-war
productivity growth? From 1960 to 2000, the average education level of the countries
in our sample increased by about 0.069 years per annum. At a long run social return of
about 42%,t h a ti m p l i e sa2.9% GDP growth per year. Actual growth is only 2% per year
over the sample period (see table II). Increased education levels alone seem to account
for more growth than is actually observed in the data. There are two explanations for
this discrepancy. First, since the long run social return takes several decades to realize,
the full eﬀect of the post-war increase in education on productivity may not yet have
been realized over the sample period. Second, skill-biased technological progress shifts
the terms of trade at the global level. This hurts countries that do not increase the
for the eﬀect of education on GDP our model captures the diﬀerences in the return across the two
samples so that the results are not aﬀected. Re-estimating table IV on the sample of countries, for
which inequality data are available, substantially deteriorates signiﬁcance but leaves most of the point
estimates and all of the conclusions unaltered.
24Notice that the coeﬃcient on education squared in table IV is
1
2β2, see equation (20).
25Caselli et.al. [1996] ﬁnd a much higher convergence rate of about 10% per year. Temple [1999]
reports panel estimates from other studies ranging from 0 to as high as 30% per year. However, Bond
et.al. [2001] show that these very high convergence rates are driven by weak instrument bias.
21education level of their work force. This explanation is conﬁrmed by our estimates:
the coeﬃcients on the time dummies show that a country that started in 1960 with an
average education level of zero and did not raise its education level since then, would
have experienced a decrease in GDP from 1970 to 2000 of about 27% or 0.9% per year.
Concluding, there is (i) strong evidence for imperfect substitution between workers
of diﬀerent education levels - also for the social rate of return to education measured
from data on GDP, (ii) the short run social return to education equals the private return,
and (iii) the long run social return is much higher than the private return, suggesting
the importance of endogenous technological progress.
4 Conclusions
We have captured the evolution of the social and the private rate of return to education
by a simple model of imperfect substitution between workers with various levels of
education and endogenous skill-biased technological progress. Human capital enters as
a factor of production in a simple constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas economy.
In the short run, the Walrasian equality between the private and the social return to
education applies. In the long run, an increase in the average education level of the
workforce also induces investment in new knowledge, driving up the long run social rate
of return to education above the long run private rate. We derived easy-to-interpret
relationships between educational attainment, GDP and the social rate of return, and
between educational attainment, income inequality and the private rate of return. Our
empirical results provide strong support for a negative relationship between the supply
of human capital and its private and social return. The estimates imply that a one year
increase in the stock of human capital reduces its return by about 2 percentage points.
The estimate for the private return is in line with conventional estimates of the elasticity
of substitution between low and high skilled workers [Katz and Murphy 1992, Ciccone
and Peri 2005].
The short run social return to education approximately equals the private return.
The long run social return, although imprecisely estimated, is clearly much higher than
the private return. Our estimates of the GDP equation represent a substantial improve-
ment over the existing growth literature, and we explain why previous studies did not
ﬁnd an eﬀect of increases in education on GDP growth. Partly, this is because of mea-
surement error, as argued by Krueger and Lindahl [2001]. But allowing for dynamics is
at least equally important. Krueger and Lindahl ﬁnd that the estimated social return in-
creases with the time intervals used. Although they attribute this eﬀect to measurement
error, it could also be driven by the fact that the long run social return is substantially
higher than the short run return.
We ﬁnd some evidence for exogenous skill-biased technological change. Mainly, how-
ever, the very high estimates for the long run social return to education suggest there was
enormous endogenous technological progress. This endogenous technological progress
appears to have been largely skill-neutral and cannot have been responsible for the in-
creased inequality in the 1980s in the US, as suggested by Acemoglu [2002]. Acemoglu
22argues that an increase in the average level of education may induce so much skill-biased
technological progress that the initial negative eﬀect on the private return to education
gets reversed. Theoretically, our model allows for this kind of overshooting of the return
to human capital in response to a shock to its supply. Empirically, however, we do not
ﬁnd support for this implication: a larger supply of human capital reduces the private
return to education unambiguously.





denote income with density f (W), distribution function F(W) and
mean M. F(W) measures the share of the population with income lower than W.L e t
Z (W) denote the cumulative share of total income earned by people with income lower







The graph of the Lorenz curve has F (W) on the horizontal and Z (W) on the vertical
axis. The Gini coeﬃcient G ∈ [0,1] is given by twice the area between the Lorenz curve
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,w h e r ew ≡ lnW and µ and σ2 are the mean and variance of w. By change of
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which maps the Gini coeﬃcient to the variance of the log income distribution σ2.N u -
merically evaluating this expression for diﬀerent values of σ shows that the relationship
is virtually linear in the relevant range. Variances of log income of 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and
0.4 correspond to Gini coeﬃcients of 52.05, 56.33, 60.39, 64.20 and 67.78, respectively.
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S t -0.00708 -0.00721 -0.00638
(3.23) (3.41) (3.68)
Constant 0.15663 0.15725 0.14513
(10.33) (10.50) (11.95)
Observations 49 49 48
R-squared 0.36 0.37 0.40
Table I
 Direct Estimates of Diminishing Returns to Schooling
Dependent variable is the return to education estimated from 
microdata. All columns include time dummies with 1990 as the 
reference year (the dummy for 1975 was dropped because there is only 
one observation in that year). WLS regression is weighted by log GDP 
per worker. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Return to education data 
from Bils and Klenow (1998). Education data from Barro and Lee. 
Original sources return to education: Rosholm and Smith 1996 
(Denmark), Calan and Reilly 1993 (Ireland), Armitage and Sabot 1987 
(Kenya and Tanzania), Alba-Ramirez and San Segundo 1995 (Spain), 
Arai 1994 (Sweden), Chiswick 1977 (Thailand), Krueger and Pischke 
1992 (USA and Germany) and Psacharopoulos 1994 (all other 
countries); see Bils and Klenow for full references.1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Total Est smpl
* Description and source
y t mean 8.5694 8.8370 9.1468 9.1877 9.3685 9.0264 10.3219 Log real GDP per worker, 1985 intl
sd 0.9639 1.2009 1.0660 1.0804 1.0987 1.1179 0.6358 prices, chain index (Penn World Table)
N 126 135 146 131 130 668 54
∆y t mean 0.0332 0.0274 0.0073 0.0112 0.0203 0.0219 10 year changes in real GDP per worker
sd 0.0236 0.0848 0.0260 0.0225 0.0499 0.0137 (annualized).
N 126 135 125 109 495 53
D t mean 0.3255 0.3557 0.3511 0.3676 0.4496 0.3875 0.3779 Variance of log income. Calculated from
sd 0.1670 0.1681 0.2026 0.2173 0.2372 0.2152 0.2038 Gini coefficient (WIID).
N 71 12 33 13 6 1 0 85 5
∆D t mean -0.0036 -0.0064 0.0019 0.0055 0.0013 0.0017 10 year changes in variance log income
sd 0.0053 0.0083 0.0098 0.0094 0.0099 0.0097 (annualized).
N 51 12 12 36 05 5
S t mean 3.5256 3.9218 4.7045 5.8108 6.2942 4.8843 8.8195 Average years of education attained by
sd 2.5502 2.7302 2.8706 3.0222 2.9350 3.0143 1.9696 population over 25 years old (Barro and
N 108 111 117 126 112 574 55 Lee).
∆S t mean 0.0450 0.0849 0.0880 0.0729 0.0729 0.0806 10 year changes in average years of 
sd 0.0604 0.0658 0.0597 0.0501 0.0614 0.0618 education (annualized).
N 107 110 111 112 440 55
V t mean 10.4796 11.9090 14.7051 17.4605 19.2567 14.8623 18.3032 Variance of the education distribution
sd 5.5679 5.8179 5.9274 6.0084 6.0673 6.7067 4.8816 (constructed from Barro and Lee data).
N 108 111 117 126 112 574 55
∆V t mean 0.1565 0.2959 0.2838 0.1683 0.2265 0.1445 10 year changes in variance education
sd 0.2809 0.3089 0.3205 0.1996 0.2875 0.3200 (annualized).
N 107 110 111 112 440 55
Table II
 Summary Statistics
* Because inequality data are only available for a (non-random) subsample of countries, the last column presents summary statistics for 
these countries only. This is the estimation sample in table III.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)






S t -0.01184 -0.02593 -0.12954 -0.13344 -0.23449 -0.20326 -0.12625
(0.43) (1.07) (1.29) (1.27) (1.85) (3.06) (2.60)
S t
2 0.00631 0.00668 0.01176 0.00968 0.00522
(1.02) (1.04) (1.34) (2.21) (1.74)
V t -0.00875 -0.00536 -0.00498 0.00514 -0.00230 -0.00396
(1.53) (0.77) (0.69) (0.59) (0.38) (0.90)
S t- 1 0.01351 0.02207 0.06604 0.06671 0.05309 0.14499 0.10316
(0.54) (0.92) (0.81) (0.78) (0.93) (3.08) (3.09)
S t- 1
2 -0.00293 -0.00311 -0.00131 -0.00737 -0.00466
(0.56) (0.58) (0.36) (2.25) (2.24)
V t- 1 0.00364 0.00212 0.00174 0.00697 0.00088 0.00162
(0.69) (0.36) (0.28) (1.61) (0.13) (0.59)
D t- 1 0.83183 0.87527 0.84497 0.83861 0.37394 0.63663 0.95507
(5.88) (6.46) (5.28) (5.08) (1.62) (3.35) (11.64)
Observations 55 55 55 54 55 55 55
Nr Countries 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Test for joint significance of education and education squared and their lags
F-statistic 0.22 0.68 1.07 0.90 3.15 13.16 6.68
p-value 0.80 0.51 0.39 0.47 0.06 0.00 0.00
Implied private return to education
Short run 0.07187 0.06870 0.09085 0.09428 0.09536
(2.24) (2.11) 2.59 (5.56) (4.77)
Long run 0.20215 0.19942 0.10005 0.08828 0.41933
(1.49) (1.46) 2.31 (2.15) (0.81)
Test that long run return equals short run return
F-statistic 0.87 0.87 0.05 0.02 0.41
p-value 0.36 0.36 0.82 0.88 0.53
Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. All columns include time dummies. Columns (1) through (6) also include 
dummies for the definition of the Gini coefficient, both contemporaneous and lagged. Column (7) includes 
dummies for every change in definition of the Gini coefficient within a country (20 in total). The implied 
return to education is calculated at an average education level of 6.3 years (the sample average in 2000). The 
standard errors were calculated using the delta method.
Table III
Income Inequality and the Private Return
The Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator in columns (6) and (7) are 1-step estimates and assume the 
regressors are predetermined, not necessarily exogenous. The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions has a 
p-value of 1.00 in both columns. The Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation have the following p-values. 
Column (6): 0.07 for AR(1), 0.37 for AR(2). Column (7): 0.07 for AR(1), 0.18 for AR(2).(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)




S t and S t -1 
with time 
dummies
S t 0.08320 0.16526 0.16270 0.02783 0.03995 0.27592 0.45126
(4.14) (3.13) (3.03) (0.73) (0.63) (3.24) (3.30)
S t
2 -0.00747 -0.00736 -0.00074 0.00082 -0.01563 -0.02832
(2.12) (2.09) (0.30) (0.22) (2.85) (3.70)
K t 0.53185
(15.24)
S t- 1 -0.05361 -0.08856 -0.08831 -0.01745 -0.03294 -0.21248 -0.03775
(2.71) (1.63) (1.59) (0.43) (0.62) (2.52) (0.40)
S t- 1
2 0.00396 0.00397 0.00018 0.00508 0.01525 0.00741
(1.03) (1.03) (0.07) (1.48) (2.57) (1.39)
K t- 1 -0.38090
(11.31)
y t- 1 0.94621 0.93532 0.93452 0.79246 0.23001 0.94274 0.64440
(46.29) (45.03) (44.60) (22.20) (3.46) (10.43) (4.01)
Observations 385 385 385 344 274 385 385
Nr Countries 111 111 111 95 106 111 111
Test for joint significance of education squared and lagged education squared
*
F-statistic 6.12 6.00 0.21 2.14 4.09 2.91
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.12 0.02 0.01
Implied social return to education
Short run 0.08320 0.07120 0.07005 0.01848 0.05024 0.07916 0.09473
(4.14) (3.47) (3.39) (1.30) (1.77) (2.65) (1.14)
Long run 0.55013 0.50279 0.48486 0.01611 0.10547 1.02370 0.42262
(4.44) (4.28) (4.24) (0.60) (2.20) (0.83) (6.15)
Test that long run return equals short run return
F-statistic 13.46 13.85 13.78 0.01 3.79 0.57 6.35
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.05 0.45 0.01
* In column (7) this test also includes the interaction terms and their lags.
Robust t statistics in parentheses. All columns include time dummies and a dummy for the version of the Penn 
World Table from where GDP data were taken. The implied return to education is calculated at an average 
education level of 6.3 years (the sample average in 2000). The standard errors were calculated using the delta 
method.
Table IV
GDP and the Social Return
Column (7) includes interaction terms of education and education lagged with time dummies. The individual 
coefficient estimates are -0.03838 (0.47) in 1970, -0.02124 (0.28) in 1980 and 0.00013 (0.00) in 1990 for 
education, and -0.06440 (0.83) in 1970, -0.04649 (0.62) in 1980 and -0.03153 (0.46) in 1990 for lagged 
education. Tests for joint significance of these interaction terms are as follows. Contemporaneous interactions 
only: F-statistic 0.23, p-value 0.88. Lagged interactions only: F-statistic 0.26, p-value 0.86. All six interaction 
terms: F-statistic 2.72, p-value 0.02.
The Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator in columns (6) and (7) are 1-step estimates and assume the 
regressors are predetermined, not necessarily exogenous. The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions has a 
p-value of 0.03 in column (6) and 0.63 in column (7). The Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation have the 
following p-values. Column (6): 0.00 for AR(1), 0.23 for AR(2). Column (7): 0.06 for AR(1), 0.30 for AR(2).